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Responsibilism within Reason
Kurt Sylvan
. Introduction
According to ambitious responsibilism (AR), the virtues that are constitu-
tive of epistemic responsibility should play a central and fundamental role
in traditional projects like the analysis of justification and knowledge.
While AR enjoyed a shining moment in the mid-s, it has fallen on
hard times. Part of the reason is that many epistemologists – including
fellow responsibilists – think it paints an unreasonably demanding picture
of knowledge and justification. While AR’s defenders have responses to
this worry, they tend either to collapse AR into a much less ambitious
view, or to threaten virtue’s explanatory force in AR’s analyses.
I agree that such objections undermine AR’s existing versions. But
I think it would be premature to draw the curtains on the view. My goal
is to show that the stock objections only threaten the periphery of certain
versions of AR, and to develop a novel version that avoids them. With this
goal in mind, here is the plan. I will begin in Section . by clarifying
the core commitments of AR and explain how influential responsibilists
have added to these commitments in optional ways. In Section ., I will
rehearse the standard objections to AR, explaining why they only target
optional accretions. I’ll then turn in Section . to develop a version I call
Kantian Responsibilism (KR). KR is a two-level view, consisting of (i) a
high-level analysis of epistemic normativity in responsibilist terms, and (ii)
a first-order account of the conditions under which these terms apply.
According to KR’s first tier, epistemically virtuous thought is thought that
 This is my shorter and less loaded name for what Baehr () calls strong conservative responsibilism.
Note that Baehr usefully distinguished weak and strong as well as autonomous and conservative
responsibilism. Weak versions hold that responsibilist virtue properties play an important but
auxiliary role in epistemology, while strong versions hold that they play a central role; autonomous
versions hold that traditional projects in epistemology ought to be replaced by independent inquiry
into intellectual virtue, while conservative versions maintain that virtue epistemology can contribute
to traditional projects.

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manifests respect for truth; because I hold that manifesting certain reasons-
sensitive dispositions is necessary and sufficient for respecting truth, KR’s
second tier takes epistemic virtues to coincide substantively with reasons-
sensitive dispositions. After unpacking KR in Section ., I show in
Section . how it answers the objections to AR. I close in Section
. by making some broader points about KR’s virtues, especially when
compared with reliabilist virtue epistemology.
. AR: Core and Periphery
Let’s begin by recalling how responsibilism developed in response to the
early reliabilist virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa.
When first formulated by Sosa (), virtue epistemology (VE) was
offered as a contribution to traditional projects concerning the nature and
structure of knowledge and justification. In this formulation, VE was not
sharply distinguished from the simple reliabilism of Goldman ();
indeed, the title of Sosa’s (: ) key section was ‘Reliabilism: an
ethics of moral virtues and an epistemology of intellectual virtues.’ This
feature prompted a demand for a stronger break with tradition, with Code
(: ) suggesting in responsibilism’s first articulation that we should
‘offer a different approach to epistemology, based upon an entirely differ-
ent set of expectations from those that have long constituted the funda-
mental motivations of foundationalism and coherentism,’ and hold that
traditional epistemology’s ‘methodologies, but also . . . the presuppositions
and expectations that underlie them, are misguided’. Kvanvig ()
echoed Code’s thought more seditiously, recommending that we ditch
traditional epistemology for the independent study of epistemic virtue.
Early responsibilism’s radicalism was tempered in mid-s by
Zagzebski’s landmark Virtues of the Mind, which offered accounts of
knowledge and justified belief meant to rival Sosa (). Zagzebski
() remains AR’s high watermark. Unfortunately, however, this water-
mark has been maintained partly because many virtue epistemologists have
rejected Zagzebski’s project. Some have returned to the autonomous VE of
Code and Kvanvig. Others have sought compromises. Baehr () advo-
cates a ‘weak conservative’ responsibilism that agrees on the importance of
traditional epistemological projects yet holds that responsibilist virtue has a
merely auxiliary role in them. Some reliabilist virtue epistemologists, on the
other hand, now deny that there is a real tension between their projects and
 See Roberts and Wood .
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responsibilists’, recommending a merger. For example, Greco ()
invokes both responsibility and reliability in his account of justification,
while Sosa () suggests that responsibilist themes follow from reliabilist
VE properly understood.
While the hope of defending an undiluted responsibilism as ambitious
as Zagzebski’s has disappeared, I think this pessimism rests on mistaking
peripheral features of certain versions of AR for core features. None of the
objections to Zagzebski () undermine AR when core and periphery
are distinguished, as we’ll see.
.. The Core
As I understand it, AR’s fundamental claim is simple:
(ARC) Responsibilist virtue properties should play a central and fundamen-
tal role in the analysis of epistemically normative properties.
Three parts of this claim require unpacking, however, raising three ques-
tions for AR:
Q: What are ‘responsibilist virtue properties’?
Q: What does it take to play a ‘central and fundamental role’?
Q: What counts as an epistemically normative property?
I think many objections to ARC rest on false assumptions about how we
should answer Q–.
On Q. To understand what ARC says, we need minimal answers to
Q– that existing defenders of ARC and I would both accept. Proceeding
backwards from Q, we can start with the truism that epistemically
normative properties are a special case of normative properties, where
‘normative’ is understood broadly to include the normativity associated
with standards of correctness that fall short of all-things-considered signif-
icance, like norms of prescriptive grammar and etiquette. Normative
properties across domains then come in various flavors. There are evalua-
tive properties, including thin ones like goodness and badness, and thick
ones like courageousness, shrewdness, and grubbiness. There are also
deontic properties, most obviously including permissibility and obligation,

‘Normative’ is sometimes used more narrowly for standards we ought objectively to care about; see,
e.g., Kolodny  and Broome . It is unclear whether epistemology is normative in this sense.
Early responsibilists like Code () took it to be a virtue of their view that it made epistemology
normative in this sense, but I remain unsure.
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but also justification in my book. Finally, there are what Zimmerman
() calls hypological properties – blameworthiness, excusability, and
praiseworthiness. Normative properties and relations are either paradig-
matic members of one of these categories, or ones analyzable in terms of
these. Epistemically normative properties and relations are ones hose
normativity is tied to the constitutive aims or norms of believing.
Note that when epistemically normative properties and relations are
understood in this way, it is not so clear that knowledge is normative.
Knowledge might well be the norm of belief, in the sense of being what
we need in order to believe permissibly. But something can be the norm
of something else without being normatively constituted. Pleasure
might be the norm of desire, for example, but it is just a psychological
state. Similarly, it is compatible with treating knowledge as the norm of
belief to hold that knowledge is just a generic factive mental state that
has as species states like seeing that p and hearing that p. Since this view
is not obviously false, we shouldn’t include knowledge among the
paradigmatically items.
If knowledge were analyzable in terms of justification, it would be
normative in our sense, by having as a constituent a paradigmatically
normative property. But this claim is neither obvious nor an essential part
of the traditional epistemology to which AR contributes. The tradition
includes a strain of non-normativism about knowledge: Goldman ()
and Dretske () were surely key moments in traditional epistemology,
even if they involved broke with a yet older orthodoxy.
On Q. Let’s consider now how one might neutrally answer Q. By
talking about a ‘central and fundamental role,’ defenders of AR have in
mind (a) that responsibilist virtue properties do the bulk of the analytical
work, with other properties playing a merely enabling role, and (b) that
these properties cannot be replaced without loss of explanatory power by
other properties.
 Alston () recommended viewing justification as a merely evaluative property. But this insistence
involved two mistakes. First, Alston assumed that voluntary control is a precondition for deontic
assessment, which has been rightly questioned by doxastic compatibilists like Hieronymi () and
McHugh (). Second, even if Alston were right that voluntary control is a precondition for
deontic assessment, we shouldn’t deny that justification is a deontic property: we should rather stop
talking about justification and replace it with talk about epistemic goodness.
 Teleologists would prefer the ideology of aims and their opponents would prefer the ideology of
norms, broadly understood to include constitutive standards and not just deontological injunctions.
This distinction between teleological and non-teleological theories crosscuts the distinction between
VE and non-virtue-theoretic epistemologies. Some virtue epistemologists (e.g. Sosa and Greco) are
teleologists. Responsibilists inspired by Aristotle may also count as teleologists. But responsibilists
can reject teleology.
  
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To see what is meant by (a), we can contrast versions of AR with
theories that partly invoke responsibilist virtue, like Greco’s ().
According to Greco (: ), a belief is fully epistemically virtuous iff
it is both a manifestation of an objectively reliable disposition and episte-
mically responsible, where epistemic responsibility consists in manifesting
the dispositions constitutive of being motivated to believe the truth. This
account is not purely reliabilist. But it is not a version of AR, since
reliability is equally foregrounded. Reliability is also fundamental on Gre-
co’s theory – it isn’t treated as significant merely because it follows from a
more basic responsibilist requirement. This point matters, since it is often
forgotten that Zagzebski () agreed that full epistemic virtue entails
reliability, but maintained that reliability’s significance derives from a
responsibilist virtue requirement.
Hence, while Zagzebski and Greco agree that manifestations of reliabilist
and responsibilist virtues are equally necessary for some central epistemic
statuses, Zagzebski doesn’t treat the former as fundamentally explanatory.
So only Zagzebski qualifies as a defender of AR. Greco () is, however,
closer to AR than Sosa (). Sosa’s latest view is the mirror image of
Zagzebski’s, seeking to derive responsibilist themes from a unified
competence-theoretic framework.
On Q. Whether Sosa’s reduction of responsibilist virtue to competence-
theoretic virtue works partly depends on what counts as a responsibilist
virtue property. Here some room for variation among responsibilisms has
been strangely overlooked.
According to the standard answer to Q, responsibilist virtue properties
are character traits of the sort ascribed to persons when we deem them
(e.g.) open-minded thinkers. I have elsewhere argued that responsibilists
ought to ditch the emphasis on character traits in general and rich traits
like open-mindedness and intellectual courage in particular, and I build
on this point below. But there is a simpler objection to this answer to Q:
it omits any mention of epistemic responsibility!
Perhaps previous responsibilists implicitly assumed that the best way
to analyze responsibility will be via the manifestation of character traits,
and jumped to articulating AR characterologically to forestall questions
about epistemic responsibility. But whatever the reason, I don’t think the
characterological gloss belongs in a neutral characterization of responsi-
bilism. It reflects a substantive and, I think, false theory about epistemic
responsibility.
 See Sylvan .
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A more natural and neutral characterization would appeal directly to
epistemic responsibility, leaving various substantive theories open: respon-
sibilist virtue properties will be virtue properties that can be instantiated
only by subjects with the capacity for epistemic responsibility. There is
then an independent question about what counts as a virtue property.
Here again previous responsibilists jumped the gun in assuming that virtue
properties are fundamentally instantiated by persons rather than acts and
attitudes. In ethics, there is an opposing tradition represented by Thomson
(), Hurka (), and Harman () according to which virtue
terms apply most fundamentally to acts and attitudes, where applications
to persons get analyzed in these more fundamental terms. While Hurka is
not a virtue ethicist, Harman and Thomson uphold a novel version of
virtue ethics. VE can make the same move, as I noted in Sylvan ().
The move gains plausibility from two points. The first is Hurka’s ()
point that a person who isn’t virtuous can sometimes perform virtuous acts
and merit high praise for them. The second point is that analyzing the act’s
virtuousness as its being the sort of act a virtuous person would perform is
unhelpfully indirect as well as extensionally inadequate. Even if the
virtuous person would have performed this sort of act, this particular act
might be performed for vicious reasons. Of course, one might add that the
act be done for the sorts of motives the virtuous person would have. But the
particular motives could have been acquired only in virtue of past vicious-
ness. Instead of adopting these unhelpfully indirect analyses, I suggested in
Sylvan () that it is at least as plausible to appeal directly to virtuous
acts and attitudes, and characterize virtuous people as people who tend to
do virtuous acts or form virtuous attitudes. I won’t repeat my arguments
for this view. Here what matters is that virtue properties cannot be
neutrally characterized as traits or global dispositions, since this character-
ization prejudges the substantive question of whether person-attaching
virtue properties are fundamental.
How can we give a more neutral characterization? One straightforward
way involves linguistic ascent. There is a recognizable class of virtue terms,
like ‘conscientious,’ ‘open-minded,’ and ‘courageous.’ These terms apply
not just to persons, but also acts, attitudes, and motives independently of
what we think about the person generally. With these points in mind, we
can give the following neutral characterization of responsibilist virtue
properties:
 Cf. Sylvan : .
  
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Responsibilist Virtue Properties (RVP): A responsibilist virtue property is
a property ascribed by a virtue term (e.g. ‘conscientious’) whose felicitous
use presupposes that the relevant subject has the capacity for epistemic
responsibility.
Core AR is then the view that upholds ARC, with responsibilist virtue
properties understood according to RVP, and the notions of epistemic
normativity and a ‘central and fundamental role’ understood in the
foregoing ways.
.. The Periphery
This neutral characterization makes it easy to see how existing versions of
AR add peripheral assumptions about (i) epistemic responsibility, (ii) the
scope and priority of virtue properties, and (iii) which specific responsibi-
list virtue properties should figure in the analysis of epistemic normativity.
We should realize that there might be better versions of AR that drop these
assumptions.
While Zagzebski is not AR’s only defender, I’ll use her version to
illustrate some accretions wrongly regarded as representative of AR. Similar
points apply to other existing versions of AR, but I focus on Zagzebski
because her version is best known, and its reception strongly affected AR’s
generally.
Zagzebski makes five key peripheral choices. First, she understands
virtues as stable character traits. Second, she understands virtuous epi-
stemic motivation as the desire for knowledge or, in other work, the love
of truth. Third, she assumes that there is a tight connection between
responsibility and character traits. Fourth, she holds that epistemic virtue
is a kind of moral virtue. Fifth, Zagzebski’s responsibilist analyses of
knowledge and justified belief are indirect in a way that threatens virtue’s
explanatory force: for example, Zagzebski doesn’t require that justified
beliefs actually manifest virtues, but just that justified believers believe
the sorts of things and have the sorts of motivations that virtuous
people would.
Some of these choices can be observed in Zagzebski’s (: )
account of virtue:
A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired excellence of
a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired
end and reliable success in bringing about that end.
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This account of virtue illustrates Zagzebski’s emphasis on character traits.
It also illustrates her emphasis on a certain sort of motivation. Her charac-
terization is already questionable by invoking a motivation to produce a
desired end, which seemingly excludes non-consequentialist and non-
Humean virtues such as respect from counting. As Scanlon (:
–) and Parfit (: –) observe, respect for life needn’t
require desiring or seeking to preserve life in every case (consider assisted
suicide and voluntary euthanasia). Perhaps it is necessarily true that there is
some end or other that one ought to desire to produce whenever one
manifests respect for a value V. But this fact is not what makes respect
for V a virtue: if one ought to desire that end, it is because one ought to
respect V, not vice versa.
Zagzebski’s characterization of the motivational requirement on episte-
mic virtue is yet more problematic. In Zagzebski (: –), the
relevant motivation is the desire to acquire knowledge, though Zagzebski
() later emphasized the desire to acquire truth. As we’ll see in Section
., these ways of understanding the motivational requirement on epi-
stemic virtue lead to serious objections: when the motivational require-
ment is understood in these ways, it is unclear how knowledge and
justified belief can be helpfully analyzed in terms of epistemic virtue.
The fourth and fifth features of Zagzebski’s view emerge later in the
book. Realizing that it is too demanding to expect every case of
justification to involve a manifestation of virtue in her sense, Zagzebski
(: , my emphasis) adopts a counterfactual analysis:
A justified belief is what a person who is motivated by intellectual virtue,
and who has the understanding of his cognitive situation a virtuous person
would have, might believe in like circumstances.
As we will see in Section ., this indirectness creates an explanatory
problem: it is hard to see how we can helpfully explain the actual justified-
ness of your belief in terms of the would-be virtuousness of some coun-
terfactual person who may have reasoned differently. Zagzebski’s (:
) account of knowledge may seem more direct:
Knowledge is a state of belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue.
 Her stress on character traits seems a consequence of a more fundamental view about the relationship
between character and responsibility, which is dubious for reasons familiar from the literature against
‘true self’ accounts of moral responsibility (see, e.g., Wolf ). Zagzebski :  tells us that
‘the kind of responsibility we think of as distinctively moral and the praise and blame that
accompanies it are associated with traits that are acquired gradually in the course of forming
habits.’
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But in reading this claim, we must remember her account of acts of
intellectual virtue:
An act of intellectual virtue A is an act that arises from the motivational
component of A, is something a person with virtue A would (probably) do
in the circumstances, is successful in achieving the end of the A motivation,
and is such that the agent acquires a true belief . . . through these features of
the act. (: )
The resulting account of knowledge faces an explanatory problem like the
one that faces the account of justification owing to the indirect, counter-
factual nature of the second clause.
A final controversial feature of Zagzebski’s view is its claim that intel-
lectual virtue is a kind of moral virtue. When combined with her analyses
of justification and knowledge, this claim suggests that a belief cannot be
justified or knowledgeable if it is not a belief a morally virtuous person
would have. It is not clear why we should agree. One might have thought
there can be epistemically justified but false moral beliefs. It will be hard to
agree that the morally virtuous person would have them. Merely requiring
that they might have them doesn’t give us a sufficiently precise yardstick for
sorting justified and unjustified beliefs. (Of course, one might deny that
there can be justified false moral beliefs, or that fully morally virtuous
people could form epistemically unjustified beliefs. But it would be nice
not to make AR rest on such claims.)
. The Standard Objections to AR are Objections
to the Periphery
We can now see why the standard objections to AR are only objections to
peripheral features, such as the foregoing five in Zagzebski’s view.
Let’s back up and recall the objections. Some of the most persuasive
cases against AR have appeared in the last decade – especially in Alfano
(), Baehr (), Dougherty (), Olin and Doris () and Sosa
(). But the central dilemma was already clear in early responses to
Zagzebski () – especially Alston (), Greco (), and Kornblith
(). Since these papers were published in , I’ll call this dilemma
the ‘YK Dilemma.’
Alston () pressed the first horn. He found it unclear how Zagzebs-
ki’s account accommodates ordinary cases of knowledge and justified
 See Zagzebski : –.
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belief. Suppose you inadvertently come to know there’s a red book on the
table by catching a glimpse of it and automatically forming the belief. One
might doubt that you manifest any motivation to acquire knowledge or
truth. Extending Alston’s point, one might find it implausible that any of
the distinctive components of Zagzebski’s analysis are necessarily satisfied
by perceptual knowledge and justified belief.
There are ways out for Zagzebski, but they invite the dilemma’s second
horn. Consider justified belief first. Zagzebski might insist that even if you
aren’t virtuously motivated or exhibit virtuous character in believing, your
belief is the sort a person with such character and motivation would have. And
all Zagzebski requires for justification is that this is true. But while this
point shows that the case is not a direct counterexample, it raises a
question about the explanatory significance of Zagzebskian virtue, asGreco
() ) and Kornblith () stressed. It is unclear how we can explain
your belief’s justification by appealing to some counterfactual person’s
virtues. Zagzebski’s account of knowledge doesn’t so clearly invite this
worry, since it imposes an actual motivational requirement. But even if
this requirement is met by ordinary virtuous subjects, one might find it
explanatorily superfluous.
There are more and less compelling versions of this objection. I don’t
agree with Greco () that some purely reliabilist feature does the
explanatory work instead. When it comes to the kind of knowledge that
entails justification, there is an important difference between clairvoyance
and blindsight cases and ordinary perceptual cases, and I think no pure
reliabilist story explains this difference. Moreover, Greco invokes reliability
of character to address clairvoyance cases, opening his explanation up to
situationist objections and simpler worries in the cases that motivated
Harman, Hurka, and Thomsonto deny that virtuous action requires
virtuous character.
Still, a version of this objection is decisive against Zagzebski for three
reasons. First, Zagzebski’s account of the motivational requirement is too
strong. Greco () rightly insists that even if it is part of the mechanics of
adult knowledge acquisition, it isn’t part of the constitutive story. Second,
the second clause of Zagzebski’s account of knowledge still employs a
counterfactual, and it is explanatorily superfluous. Third, as Greco ()
noted, no particular forms of Zagzebskian motivation (e.g. open-
mindedness) play a constitutive role even when present. There is hence a
 But it does invoke to a similar counterfactual fact via the second clause of Zagzebski’s analysis of an
act of intellectual virtue, which invites a similar objection.
  
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dilemma for Zagzebski. On the one hand, Zagzebski invites extensional
objections: there can be knowledge without acts of intellectual virtue. To
avoid these objections, Zagzebski could emphasize the indirectness of her
appeal to virtue. But then virtue becomes explanatorily superfluous.
I take this dilemma to be the most important objection to Zagzebski,
and see most other objections as variations on it. For example, Baehr
() and Dougherty () invoke cases like Alston’s to suggest that
Zagzebski fails to explain ‘low-grade’ knowledge, and Baehr (: –)
adds that Zagzebski’s mention of virtue loses its explanatory significance if
sidelined in some counterfactual clause. The situationist objection is also a
variation: since we don’t have the relevant character traits, accounts that
require them will be extensionally inadequate, and accounts that invoke
them counterfactually make them explanatorily superfluous.
Some of Sosa’s () objections are also variations. Sosa (: –)
memorably remarks that Zagzebski’s motivational requirements aren’t met
by ‘[h]edge fund managers, waste disposal engineers, and their reception-
ists, [who] can all attain much knowledge in the course of an ordinary
workday despite the fact that they seek the truths relevant to their work
only for their instrumental value,’ adding that ‘[t]hat is why they want
them, not because they love truth.’ But it is worth separately noting two
further objections in the surrounding text:
Independently of all that, it remains that there is a distinctive dimension of
epistemic assessment isolated from all such broadly ethical (or prudential)
concerns. Moreover, within this epistemic dimension, love of truth plays a
negligible role at most, if any at all . . .
An assassin may even have no desire whatever for the truth on the location
of his victim except only for the fact that it will make his crime possible . . .
His search for truth, since agential, is subject to the full range of responsibi-
list assessment nonetheless. And his knowing the location of the victim in
believing as he does . . . is still epistemically better than his merely believing
correctly. (: –)
One implicit objection here is to Zagzebski’s blurring of moral and
epistemic virtue: it is unclear why beliefs with the highest epistemic
qualifications must have moral merit or be believed by someone with
moral merit. A second implicit objection is to Zagzebski’s specific moti-
vational requirement. Sosa allows that his assassin might exhibit responsi-
bilist intellectual virtues. What he denies is that love of truth is an operative
virtue, or a desire for truth in general.
 Baehr (: –) also makes this second point.
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These objections are, I believe, compelling against Zagzebski. Versions
of the YK dilemma’s first horn and the situationist objection undermine
the appeal to character traits. Sosa’s points are compelling against
Zagzebski’s motivational requirement and her claim that epistemic virtues
are moral virtues. The YK dilemma’s second horn is decisive against
Zagzebski’s indirect appeal to virtue.
But as I’ve emphasized, these features of Zagzebski’s view are peripheral.
It remains to be seen whether similar objections confront versions of AR
that drop them. I think not, and I will now turn to develop a version of AR
that avoids these objections and has independent attractions.
. Responsibilism within Reason
My version of AR is a two-tiered view. The first tier offers a metaphysical
analysis of epistemically normative properties in terms of responsibilist virtues
I call virtues of respect for truth. Because my view is a version of AR, it denies
that these virtues admit of analysis in non-responsibilist normative terms. This
view is, however, compatible with the naturalist thought that these virtues are
in turn grounded in non-normative properties. The first tier’s analysis is only
intended as a view about the internal structure of the epistemically normative
domain, leaving open how it is grounded in the non-normative.
The question of what it takes to manifest the virtues of respect for truth
can be answered in several ways. Besides answering it with an analysis of
these virtues in non-virtue-theoretic terms, one could answer it by offering
a piece of first-order normative theorizing about virtue-making characteris-
tics (by analogy with first-order theories of right action that seek to
determine what makes acts right). This observation brings us to the second
tier, which is a theory of this kind. Notably, this theory appeals to notions
reminiscent of reliabilist VE – in particular, to certain reliable (local)
dispositions, and to a distinction among ways of manifesting these
dispositions that mirrors Sosa’s adroitness/aptness distinction. But in
contrast to Sosa, these are proximally dispositions to reliably conform to
reasons, and only distally to hit the mark of truth.
I call the overall view ‘Kantian responsibilism’ (KR). I use this name
primarily because it invokes a notion reminiscent of Kantian ethics – viz.
respect – but here I understand this as a responsibilist virtue.
 I take this view to be consistent with the more systematic Kantian view I defend in Sylvan ,
because I take the views to operate at different levels. The epistemic Kantianism in Sylvan  is a
foundational first-order theory. Kantian responsibilism is a complementary theory working at two
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.. The First Part of KR: An Analysis of Epistemic Normativity
According to KR, the most fundamental properties in the epistemically
normative domain are virtues of respect for truth. Two are especially
crucial. On the one hand, manifesting full respect for truth requires
forming doxastic attitudes that conform to epistemic reasons (of some
sort) as a manifestation of a disposition to so conform, where epistemic
reasons for (dis)belief are understood as indicators of truth and falsity. I’ll
call this sort of respect heedfulness of the standard of truth (i.e. the standard
that it is correct to believe p only if p is true). I don’t assume that heedful
belief is factive: even if you form a false belief, you might be sufficiently
heedful of the standard of truth if your evidence strongly supports it. I also
don’t assume that heedful belief is transparent: you can be heedful of
reasons without realizing that this is what you are doing, and indeed while
believing that you’re failing to do so.
Partly for that reason, manifesting full respect for truth also requires
forming attitudes that cohere with one’s beliefs about what the reasons
support. I will call this kind of respect conscientiousness relative to the
standard of truth. If you follow your convictions about what is required
for heeding the standard of truth, you are at least conscientious with
respect to that standard.
While full respect for truth requires heedfulness and conscientiousness,
there may be cases in which it is impossible to manifest both. Whether
there are depends on whether we can have justified false beliefs about what
it takes to respect truth. If so, being heedful might require being uncon-
scientious in some cases. These would be epistemic analogues of Arpaly’s
() Huck Finn case. Just as the intuition is that Huck should heed the
real moral reasons and not his false beliefs, so the intuition here assuming
the case is possible is that one should be heedful at the cost of being
unconscientious. (As it happens, I doubt whether it is possible to have
justified false beliefs about what it takes to respect truth, but it is not
crucial to resolve this issue here.)
So far, I’ve been imprecise about the ontology of respect for truth. The
reason is that evaluations of respect can have different objects, and there is
a further question about which is most fundamental. A person who doesn’t
have the character trait of being heedful or conscientious relative to the
other levels: the level of analysis, and the level of factoral first-order theory. The ‘fundamental role’
played by virtue in AR is an analytically fundamental role, not a normatively fundamental role.
Hence AR is consistent with there being a deeper normative story, such as epistemic Kantianism.
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standard of truth might manifest heedfulness on some occasions or with
respect to some subject matters. When we say that this person manifests
some respect for truth, we might mean they manifest a local disposition
to form attitudes that are respectful of a certain sort of evidence. Or we
might simply mean that they on that occasion formed their beliefs in a
respectful way.
My preferred way of regimenting talk of respect is to treat respectfulness of
attitude-formation as fundamental, and to see doxastic attitudes as respectful
of truth to the extent that they manifest dispositions to form attitudes that
are respectful of the evidence and one’s beliefs about what is probably true
relative to it. We respect truth by respecting evidence and our beliefs about
what it supports. We in turn respect the evidence not just by forming the
attitudes that happen to conform to the evidence, but rather as a
manifestation of a (typically local) evidence-sensitive disposition.
We can use respect talk to pick out character traits and global disposi-
tions, but these play no fundamental role in my view. We might also talk
about an attitude of respect. But when I talk about manifesting respect,
I don’t have in mind that one has a corresponding occurrent attitude,
beyond what is minimally involved in manifesting a (typically local)
reasons-sensitive disposition.
When I turn to the substantive part of KR, I will say more about what it
takes to manifest full respect, and in turn more about what is substantively
required for various epistemic statuses. But for now, I’ll leave open some
substantive details, which are part of the periphery (though one I now
endorse).
... KR’s Account of Virtue
We can now state KR’s analyses of various epistemic properties, beginning
with the most obvious case: epistemic virtue. KR upholds the following
general claim:
KR-V: All epistemic virtue properties consist in (manifestations of )
forms of respect for truth.
We can then distinguish attitude-attaching and person-attaching virtue
properties, as well as between some varieties of the latter:
KR-Vattitudes: A doxastic attitude’s being epistemically virtuous =df-meta-
physical its being respectful of truth.
KR-Vperson-weak: A person’s being epistemically virtuous in the weak
sense =df-metaphysical their tending to have attitudes that respect truth.
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KR-Vperson-strong: A person’s being epistemically virtuous in the strong
sense =df-metaphysical their tending to have attitudes that respect truth
as a manifestation of character.
These claims are compatible with a wide range of substantive views, since
it is an open question what it takes to respect truth. Still, they are highly
non-trivial. Indeed, these claims severely restrict the scope of epistemic
virtue in a way that is unusual for responsibilism. Responsibilists often sing
praises of intellectual courage, open-mindedness, and the like. While one
might try to argue that intellectually courageous and open-minded beliefs
are necessarily respectful of truth, these claims are hardly obvious. As far as
I’m concerned, this result is a good one: while there is something morally
virtuous about open-mindedness and virtuous simpliciter about intellectual
courage, it is unclear that these properties necessarily contribute to properly
epistemic virtue.
While some responsibilists won’t share my taste for an austere concep-
tion of the properly epistemic, it is a taste that defenders of AR should,
I believe, acquire. For it is false that intellectual courage, open-mindedness,
and the like are required for justification, rationality, or knowledge.
... KR’s Accounts of Justification and Rationality
This remark brings us to KR’s account of the epistemic statuses central to
traditional epistemology.
We can start with justification. Like many epistemologists, I think there
are several properties often lumped under the heading of ‘justification.’
I reserve the term ‘rationality’ for a more subjective status, and ‘justifica-
tion’ for a more objective but still perspective-dependent status. This
distinction aligns with my distinction between the two main forms of
respect for truth, recommending:
KR-R: A doxastic attitude’s being epistemically rational =df-metaphysical its
being conscientious relative to the standard of truth.
KR-J: A doxastic attitude’s being epistemically justified =df-metaphysical its
being heedful of the standard of truth.
Of course, we want beliefs to be both heedful and conscientious. Because
I seek to preserve an analogy with ethics, I don’t want to capture this point
by saying that justification or rationality requires both: an act can be right,
and justified, even if the agent believes it is wrong (cf. Huck Finn), and an
act can be rational without being justified because it is wrong but the agent
believes otherwise, in accordance with how things appear to them. I would
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hence prefer to stipulate a term to refer to the union of the two properties,
which I’d call full epistemic worth.
Now, these analyses lack substantive implications independently of a
first-order theory of heedfulness and conscientiousness. There are different
options I don’t want to prejudge. My earlier glosses might seem to suggest
that KR is neo-evidentialist: I suggested that one is heedful of the standard
of truth by being heedful of the evidence. But as we’ll see when turning to
my full first-order story, KR is compatible with reliabilist themes and
avoids stock problems for evidentialism.
... KR’s Account of High-Grade Knowledge
A disclaimer is in order before I describe KR’s take on knowledge.
Earlier I emphasized that KR is only an account of epistemic
normativity, and that not all objects of epistemological investigation are
clearly normative. Indeed, I consider the study of what Dretske ()
called ‘epistemic seeing’ (seeing that p) as well as the study of remembering
that p, intuiting that p, and other factive mental states to be core episte-
mology. I don’t consider any of these states to be normative. If knowledge
is just a generic factive mental state, I don’t consider it normative either,
and favor divorcing the theory of knowledge from the theory of epistemic
normativity.
KR doesn’t, however, require this claim. Defenders of KR have several
options. First, they could follow Sosa in distinguishing animal knowledge
and a fancier sort of knowledge, offering an account only of the latter.
They could then insist that the former isn’t normative. Second, they could
instead deny that the determinate factive mental states are forms of
knowledge, and say that purported cases in which children or dogs have
knowledge without respect for truth aren’t cases of knowledge but just
cases involving determinate factive mental states. Finally, they could insist
that even rudimentary knowers can manifest respect for truth, by adopting
a first-order theory that only requires respectful subjects to respond to
reasons as a manifestation of reasons-sensitive dispositions.
 For my defense of this picture, see Sylvan . For antecedents, see Foley  and Kornblith
.
 I use the term ‘high-grade’ rather than ‘reflective’ for greater generality, since not all fans of bi-level
epistemology must hold that high-grade knowledge requires reflective ascent. Indeed, in and after
his  and  works, Sosa distanced himself from the old label, reserving ‘reflective knowledge’
for mere meta-apt belief and introducing the new ideas of full aptness and judgmental knowledge to
capture the fancier achievement.
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Each option is respectable. For this chapter’s purposes, I adopt the first
but understand high-grade knowledge broadly, so that most human
knowledge and some non-human animal knowledge counts. Having
issued these disclaimers, I can now state KR’s account of high-grade
knowledge:
KR-K: S’s belief that p is high-grade knowledge =df-metaphysical S’s belief
that p is accurate, heedful of the standard of truth, and its accuracy
manifests this heedfulness.
This account partly resembles some reliabilist VEs in invoking manifesta-
tion (e.g. Sosa [] and Turri []). Gettier cases are cases where the
belief is accurate and heedful but not accurate as a manifestation of
heedfulness. As a result, the view has similar Gettierological payoffs.
There are, however, big differences with reliabilist VE’s story, especially
if Sosa is the comparison. Recall how in his classic () discussion, Sosa
used the animal/reflective knowledge distinction to address fake barn
country, claiming that we have animal knowledge but lack reflective
knowledge there; while Sosa since his  and  works has distanced
himself from using the ‘reflective’ label for the highest epistemic
achievement, the approach to fake barn country remains similar. My
account of high-grade knowledge is structurally more like his account of
animal knowledge, since heedfulness needn’t be second order. If so,
I cannot make Sosa’s move.
My response is that there are other ways to diagnose the intuition. It is
open to me to offer Littlejohn ()’s type of diagnosis: the accuracy of
the belief doesn’t manifest its heedfulness. It is easy to offer this diagnosis if
manifestations of heedfulness coincide with manifestations of a sort of
ability (though I don’t think Littlejohn’s broader point requires his dis-
tinction between senses of ‘able’).
Another difference noted in passing is that KR’s account of high-grade
knowledge doesn’t emphasize the second order. It would if conscien-
tiousness were required for knowledge, or if heedfulness required con-
scientiousness. But I think neither is true. The core contrast for KR
is evinced by the contrast between the knowledge of blindsighters and
the knowledge of normal perceivers: it is a first-order difference con-
cerning whether the subject heeded a sufficient reason. Sosa’s older
 I am using ‘accuracy’ here in Sosa’s sense, to refer to the property that a belief has when its content
is true. I am not using it in the new sense introduced by epistemic utility theorists like Pettigrew
.
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‘animal’/‘reflective’ lingo is hence misleading: the core distinction is
between knowledge understood as registration of facts and knowledge
understood as Reason-produced accuracy.
.. The Second Part of KR: A Substantive Account
of What Respect Requires
The first tier of KR doesn’t give enough information to derive clear
predictions about cases. I’ll now provide this information. But it is worth
stressing that this feature of the first tier is no bug, given its point. The
point was to limn the internal structure of a normative domain. This kind
of project is standard in meta-ethics. Compare the fitting-attitudes account
of value, according to which being valuable consists in being a fitting
object of valuing. It is no objection to this view that it makes no clear
predictions about what is valuable, which is not its point. It is also no
objection that it appeals to normative notions.
Still, besides wanting a real definition of various epistemically normative
properties in fundamental normative terms, one wants a story about what
it takes for the definiens to be instantiated. My story reveals the deliberate
ambiguity of my title. This story is ‘within reason’ not only in the sense of
being reasonable to accept, but also in linking responsibilist virtues to the
abilities that constitute the faculty of theoretical reason.
Some preliminary clarifications are in order about the nature of the
story. This account will appeal to the notion of a reason, which in meta-
ethics is standardly taken to be the paradigm of normativity. But this
feature doesn’t contravene the normative fundamentality of responsibilist
virtue, for two reasons. First, because the account is first order rather than
meta-normative, it doesn’t follow that the account ultimately takes reasons
rather than virtues to be analytically prior. Second, reasons can be analyzed
in terms of responsibilist virtues: roughly, reasons are considerations that
figure in the virtuous operation of theoretical reason. This account com-
bines the Kantian aspiration of explaining reasons in terms of Reason
familiar from Korsgaard (, , ), with virtue-ethical doubts
about whether reason-relations can be captured by simple principles
familiar from McDowell () and Dancy (). While I am not as
skeptical in the epistemic case as Dancy and McDowell are in the ethical
case that simple principles can be found, I don’t see a helpful way of stating
them without implicitly adverting to responsibilist virtue.
A second clarification is in order. One might worry that my appeal to
reason conflicts with the spirit of VE, which was meant to supplant
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‘intellectualist’ models of epistemic normativity. The response to this
concern is that it rests on implicit overintellectualization of the workings of
reason. As Dancy (: –) notes in the non-epistemic case,
reasons-responsiveness needn’t involve inference (when inference is under-
stood as involving rule-following):
[m]oral thinking . . . can perfectly well be thought of as reasoning just in the
sense that it is deliberation, i.e., the discerning of interrelations of reasons[,
which] involves two basic stages. First, one recognizes what reasons are
thrown up in the situation one is in; this is not inference . . . Secondly, one
works out what those reasons require of one. This sort of working out need
not be thought of as inference either.
Responding to epistemic reasons can work in this way. After pondering the
evidence, one might treat it as favoring the best-supported hypothesis via a
reasons-sensitive competence. This process needn’t involve inference, at
least when understood in the natural sense that involves rule-following.
Still, it is reasoning – a working out of what the evidence recommends via
Reason.
... Responsibilist Virtues, Rational Capacities, and Reasons
The idea of linking responsibility and Reason is standard in the philosophy
of action. Over there, there has been a shift away from the ‘true self’ model
of responsibility – a model that perhaps implicitly guided earlier responsibi-
lists to fixate on character – and toward the reasons-responsive models of
Wolf (), Fischer and Ravizza (), and Nelkin (). The core of
this conception of responsibility is that responsible creatures are creatures
with the capacity to respond to reasons. The exercise of responsibility
consists in the ‘rational control’ of actions and attitudes by rational capac-
ities, which are dispositions to respond to reasons. This model has been
extended to the epistemic case by Hieronymi () and McHugh ().
Of course, such models are merely intended to capture responsibility in
the weak sense associated with accountability, which one can manifest
while being blameworthy. But the capacities invoked by these theorists can
operate more or less well. The well functioning of these capacities will
consist in responsiveness to good reasons. Given this point, we can exploit
certain structural distinctions familiar from performance epistemology to
 Consider Code : , who takes inspiration from Sosa  in rejecting what both call the
‘Intellectualist Model of Justification.’
 For further discussion of inference and its relation to reasons-responsiveness, see Sylvan b.
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illuminate the distinctions among exercises of rational capacities that
suffice for various epistemic statuses.
My substantive account of virtue invokes reasons-sensitive dispositions.
These dispositions proximally function to respond to reasons understood
as they are standardly understood in ethics – viz. as facts that count in
favor of acts and attitudes, where these facts are not necessarily ones to
which we have access. Of course, for the view to remain true to the spirit of
responsibilism, the favoring relation and the relation of correctly respond-
ing to reasons (‘proper basing’) might need analyzing in responsibilist
terms. But even without such an analysis, appealing to reasons at this
tier doesn’t involve any commitment to normative fundamentality: this
tier isn’t an account of the constitution of epistemic normativity but rather
a first-order account.
Now, one might separately worry about the appeal to reasons under-
stood as facts, insisting that only reasons we possess can epistemically
justify. I agree with the latter claim, but don’t think it threatens the
helpfulness of such reasons for understanding epistemic normativity. Pos-
session needn’t be understood normatively. If we understand possessing a
reason as accessing the fact that provides it, we can then understand access
in terms of factive mental states like seeing that p, remembering that p,
intuiting that p, and so on.
One might also insist that when it comes to rationality, the reasons to
which one responds in exemplifying this virtue need only be apparent facts.
But again, we needn’t understand the relevant notion of appearance nor-
matively: an apparent fact is just one that non-doxastically seems to obtain.
A final preliminary note: I assume that the paradigm examples of
epistemic reasons are pieces of evidence, understood as truth-indicating
facts or apparent facts. I don’t assume that only these can provide episte-
mic reasons. Epistemic reasons for agnosticism will include considerations
about the evidence (e.g. whether it is sufficient). Perhaps these are just
higher-order evidence. But I’ll remain neutral, assuming only evidence
provides the paradigm example of an epistemic reason for (dis)belief, and
 One could also take this relation to be non-normative: perhaps the evidence-for relation isn’t
normatively constituted, and the capacities constitutive of theoretical reason are capacities to
respond to evidence.
 Note that if accessing a fact is understood as a determinable factive mental episode that takes as
determinates factive mental episodes like seeing that p and remembering that p, there is no need to
impose any normative qualification on such access (e.g. to qualify it as proper access). I take this way
of understanding access to be more intuitive than an understanding that would count mere
believing as a form of access. It is counterintuitive to claim that mere belief that p gives one
access to the fact that p (though pre-Williamsonian epistemologists often talked otherwise).
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that the yardstick of sufficiency tracks whether heeding the reasons would
be respectful of truth.
... Conditions for Respectful Belief-Formation
We now have the necessary ingredients for a substantive account of our
responsibilist virtues and the epistemic statuses they ground.
We can begin with the thought that the responsibilist virtues coincide
substantively with certain rational capacities. Epistemic rational capaci-
ties in turn are dispositions to form doxastic attitudes in certain condi-
tions, and to take certain kinds of considerations into account in doxastic
deliberation. Here there are two sets of crucial distinctions: distinctions
concerning the extent to which (i) these dispositions qualify as rational
capacities, and (ii) these dispositions qualify as manifestations of rational
capacities. Corresponding to these distinctions will be substantive con-
ditions for various forms of respect for truth, and for respectful attitude-
formation.
A disposition to form doxastic attitudes of type D in conditions of type
C qualifies as a minimal rational capacity if conditions of type C constitute
sufficient apparent epistemic reasons for attitudes of type D. A disposition
to form doxastic attitudes of type D in conditions of type C qualifies as a
full rational capacity if conditions of type C constitute sufficient possessed
epistemic reasons for doxastic attitudes of type D, where these reasons
aren’t merely apparent.
When the ‘apparent’ is understood as ‘apparent relative to one’s doxastic
attitudes,’ having a disposition of the first sort coincides as a first-order
matter with local conscientiousness relative to the standard of truth. When
the ‘apparent’ is understood relative to the non-doxastic appearances,
having a disposition of the first sort coincides as a first-order matter with
weak local respectfulness of the standard of truth. Having a disposition of
the second sort coincides as a substantive normative matter strong local
respectfulness of the standard of truth.
These dispositions can in turn be manifested in different ways. Sup-
pose one seeks to predict the behavior of some object, relying on an
inductive disposition to form predictions of type T given evidence of
 This substantive account remains high level, since there are further questions about when
(apparent) facts provide (apparent) evidence. But substantive normative theorizing has levels of
its own: as Kagan  stresses, normative ethics operates at two levels of generality, with factoral
normative theorizing seeking just to articulate all factors relevant to the exemplification of
normative properties, and foundational normative theorizing seeking an account of which factors
are most fundamental. See Sylvan  for the foundational story.
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type E. This disposition is a minimal rational capacity. A belief might
manifest this capacity despite the evidence being misleading or merely
apparent. But it might manifest this capacity when the evidence is not
misleading. It might be
• correct as a manifestation of a full rational capacity,
• manifest a full rational capacity but be correct just by luck,
• incorrect but manifest a full rational capacity,
• incorrect but manifest a minimal rational capacity.
Each case corresponds to a substantive condition for some form of respect:
• Fully respectful belief: A belief is fully respectful iff correct as a mani-
festation of its responsiveness to possessed epistemic reasons (where
this is mediated by a full rational capacity).
• Strongly heedful belief: A belief is strongly heedful iff it conforms to
possessed epistemic reasons as a manifestation of a full rational
capacity.
• Weakly heedful belief: A belief is weakly heedful iff it conforms to
apparent epistemic reasons in the non-doxastic sense of ‘apparent’ as
a manifestation of a minimal rational capacity.
• Conscientious belief: A belief is conscientious iff it conforms to apparent
epistemic reasons in the doxastic sense of ‘apparent’ as a manifestation
of a minimal rational capacity.
There are intermediate cases between the first and second statuses. These
are Gettier cases: the belief will be correct and reasons-responsive, but not
correct as a manifestation of reasons-responsiveness.
... Conditions for Justification, Rationality, and High-Grade Knowledge
We can now turn to substantive conditions for the various epistemic
statuses and see the case for a further distinction among sorts of rationality.
From KR-R and the substantive conditions for conscientiousness, we can
derive the following conditions for rationality:
KR-RS: A doxastic attitude is rational iff it conforms to apparent
epistemic reasons in a doxastic sense of ‘apparent’ as a manifestation
of a minimal rational capacity.
This thesis illuminates rationality in the structural sense standard in ethics
(e.g. in Scanlon [], Kolodny [], and Broome []), which
Worsnip () encourages epistemologists to take into account, and
which has an antecedent in Foley’s () notion of rationality. This
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notion of rationality doesn’t correspond neatly to the sort that interests
internalists in epistemology. But note that we can divide KR-R into two
claims, with the distinction between conscientious and weakly heedful
belief providing the foundation:
KR-R-: A doxastic attitude’s being structurally rational =df-metaphysical its
being conscientious relative to the standard of truth.
KR-R+: A doxastic attitude’s being substantively rational =df-metaphysical
its being weakly heedful relative to the standard of truth.
We can then also divide KR-RS into two claims:
KR-RS-: A doxastic attitude is structurally rational iff it conforms to
apparent epistemic reasons in a doxastic sense of ‘apparent’ as a
manifestation of a minimal rational capacity.
KR-RS+: A doxastic attitude is substantively rational iff it conforms to
apparent epistemic reasons in the non-doxastic sense of ‘apparent’ as
a manifestation of a minimal rational capacity.
Both sorts of rationality then turn out distinct from justification if the
latter is understood in terms of strong heedfulness, via the following
precisification of KR-J:
KR-J+: A doxastic attitude’s being justified =df-metaphysical its being
strongly heedful with respect to the standard of truth.
Given the substantive conditions for strong heedfulness, we can then
derive:
KR-JS+: A doxastic attitude is justified iff it conforms to possessed
epistemic reasons as a manifestation of a full rational capacity.
Finally, we get substantive conditions for high-grade knowledge by under-
standing high-grade knowledge as fully respectful belief and invoking the
substantive conditions for the latter:
KR-KS: A belief is high-grade knowledge iff it is correct as a manifes-
tation of its responsiveness to possessed epistemic reasons (where this
manifestation is mediated by a full rational capacity).
The result is a complete first-order normative epistemology for the most
central epistemic statuses.
Extensionally, this view will fall somewhere between evidentialism and
Sosa’s () performance epistemology for judgment. It is unlike evi-
dentialism in three respects. First, it fundamentally provides substantive
conditions for doxastic justification. Second, unlike Conee and Feldman’s
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() evidentialism, the notion of a reason to which this view appeals is
non-mentalist. Of course, only possessed reasons do much epistemic work.
But possession is a relation that holds in virtue of factive mental states,
not the non-factive ones of Conee and Feldman’s mentalism. Although
reasons that appear to exist relative to non-factive mental states play some
role, cognition doesn’t aspire merely to respond to these apparent rea-
sons. A third difference is that KR invokes dispositions to conform to
reasons, inducing a threefold pattern reminiscent of Sosa’s AAA pattern.
A belief can
• merely conform to some reasons (by being favored by them);
• manifest a reasons-sensitive disposition;
• conform as a manifestation of a reasons-sensitive disposition.
The view is, however, not extensionally equivalent to Sosa’s, since Sosa
doesn’t require reasons-responsiveness even at the judgmental level. I’ve
argued elsewhere that this feature of Sosa’s view is problematic, so I take
the difference to represent an advantage for KR.
.. A Consistent Reduction Plan
To remain true to responsibilism, we need an analysis of epistemic reasons
either in responsibilist terms or in terms that render reasons non-
normative. My preference is for a version of the first option that makes
KR Kantian in a further way, but I think there are respectable versions of
the second.
Before discussing either option, I’ll stress again that it is compatible with
these metaphysical stories that we have independent conceptual grasp on
epistemic reasons and the conditions under which they make belief-
formation respectful. If we have this grasp, we don’t need the reductions
below to derive clear predictions from my two-tiered account. And we do,
I believe, have sufficient pre-theoretical grasp of the concept of a reason for
the account to be predictive. The point of this section, then, is merely to
show that appealing to reasons in a first-order theory doesn’t contravene
the metaphysical claim that responsibilist virtues come first.
... A Consistently Kantian Reduction Plan
Following Way (), Gregory (), and Silverstein (), defenders
of the first reduction plan will first invoke a high-level analysis of reasons as
 See Sylvan forthcoming.
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inputs to good reasoning, where ‘reasoning’ is understood broadly to
include non-inferential transitions like the transition from seeming to see
that p to believing that p. Good theoretical reasoning is then analyzed as
reasoning that is respectful of truth, where there is no commitment to such
reasoning being economically codifiable without invoking responsibilist
normativity (otherwise the view would be fundamentally just Kantian, not
virtue-theoretic). We needn’t deny that good reasoning follows patterns,
however: it is just that nothing holds them together apart from their
contributions to respect for truth.
There is a further Kantian step we can take without sacrificing this
virtue-theoretic theme. We can give a constitutivist reduction of theoretical
normativity, viewing good patterns of reasoning as patterns constitutive in
the sense that thought must often enough conform to them to count as
reasoning at all. This step also shows how we might ground epistemic
normativity in the non-normative: the study of epistemic normativity is
the study of the statuses associated with patterns of thought constitutive of
theoretical reasoning, full sensitivity to which constitutes respect for truth.
... Non-Normativism about (Epistemic) Reasons?
A different option is to deny that invoking reasons is invoking some non-
responsibilist normative property, by denying that reasons are essentially
normative. This option flouts the recent meta-ethical chant that has it that
reasons are the paradigmatic normative items. To those entranced by this
chant, this option will seem bewildering. But it has been pursued by
Broome () and Finlay (), who take the fundamental notion of
a reason to be explanatory, and take normative reasons to be a special case
of reasons so understood. On this view, normative reasons are normative
only in virtue of being explanations of normative facts.
Now, Broome and Finlay appeal to non-virtue-theoretic normative
notions: for Broome, reasons to ϕ are explanations of why one ought to
ϕ, while for Finlay, reasons are explanations of things are good in some
way. But one could imagine a virtue-theoretic variant on which reasons
provide explanations of why certain attitudes would be virtuous in a
responsibilist sense.
A different option would treat epistemic reasons specifically as non-
normative. The most obvious version of this view would combine the
view that all epistemic reasons are evidence with the view that the
evidence-for relation is non-normative, consisting perhaps in some truth-
indication or probabilification relation, with probability understood non-
normatively.
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. Answers to the Standard Objections
Whichever form it takes, the view I’ve outlined dispatches with the
standard objections to AR.
The first horn of the YK dilemma is easily addressed. To be sure, KR
imposes requirements that one might call ‘motivational.’ But as a sub-
stantive matter, these requirements will be met by subjects who attain the
relevant epistemic statuses. For given our first-order story, it will be fine to
ascribe such respect to justified believers and high-grade knowers. While it
is not uncontroversial that rationality, justification, and high-grade
knowledge require responding to reasons, these claims are defensible and
cannot be rejected out of hand. Indeed, these claims have been defended
by some reliabilist virtue epistemologists when reasons are understood as
I’ve understood them.
The further requirement that this responsiveness manifest a form of
reasons-sensitivity enables KR to secure reliabilist VE’s good predictions
about cases of accidental conformity to reasons. In Greco’s (: )
example of the poor math student who accidentally lands on a correct
algorithm for solving a problem, such sensitivity is not manifest. It would
be a mistake to insist that reliability of character is what’s really needed.
Poor math students can manifest understanding of some algorithms, and
when they solve problems as a manifestation of that understanding, they
attain justified belief and perhaps high-grade knowledge. Character-based
views undergenerate epistemic status in such cases.
The second horn of the YK dilemma is straightforwardly addressed if it
takes Kornblith’s form. Kornblith was worried about the explanatory
helpfulness of Zagzebski’s merely counterfactual appeal to virtue properties.
Our view doesn’t make a counterfactual appeal: it requires that the justified
believer actually manifest respect. So, it cannot face Kornblith’s worry.
Greco’s version of the worry is more interesting. He insists that it is
unclear what explanatory role Zagzebski-type virtues as such play. Here he
invokes a sub-dilemma. He observes that the success component of
Zagzebski-style virtues can be understood either to yield truth-reliability
 Matt Stitcher emphasized in p.c. that it is unclear that respect for truth is a kind of motivation rather
than a kind of deliberative constraint. I agree that respect isn’t any sort of desire. As an anti-Humean
about motivation, I don’t think it follows that respect isn’t a kind of motivation. Perhaps more
revealing is the point that the person who manifests respect for truth needn’t have any thoughts
about the value of truth among their reasons.
 See Sylvan and Sosa , where Sosa agrees that rationality and justification entail reasons-
responsiveness.
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or to not do so. If the latter holds, Greco thinks the account makes bad
predictions: math students who follow unreliable algorithms accidentally
but are generally responsible in Zagzebski’s sense won’t thereby have
justified beliefs. If the former holds, Greco (: ) thinks ‘it is the
agent-reliability that is doing the work, and nothing about Zagzebski-type
virtues as such.’
But this last claim doesn’t extend to KR for two reasons. The first is a
general reason that also helps Zagzebski. The fact that reliability is neces-
sary for manifesting responsibilist virtues obviously doesn’t imply that it is
sufficient. Clairvoyance cases suggest that a responsibilist virtue property is
also necessary, as Greco (: ) agrees. Perhaps it isn’t necessary for
animal knowledge, and perhaps clairvoyants have such knowledge. But
one can use this point to argue that animal knowledge is not normative,
and hence not among KR’s analysanda.
Now, one might instead complain that it is ad hoc for Zagzebski to
stipulate that responsibilist virtues are truth-reliable, and that our intuitive
notions of, e.g., open-mindedness and intellectual courage don’t entail
truth-reliability. One might hence worry that there isn’t a principled
responsibilist rationale for this requirement. But KR avoids this objection.
Sensitivity to reasons understood as facts is constitutive of what I earlier
called strong heedfulness, which does entail at least indexical truth-
reliability (and one might take the new evil demon problem to suggest
this is all we can demand).
There is a third way to make Greco’s point, but it requires a normative
analogue of the exclusion principle that threatens any appeal to virtue. One
might argue that the properties in my substantive account of respect do the
explanatory work, and that the supervening respect isn’t doing any work.
But this objection overgeneralizes. The reasoning is only compelling given
the more general principle that the properties subvening normative statuses
do the real work. This principle suggests that the non-normative properties
that subvene any virtue properties do the work, not the virtue properties as
such. Such, at any rate, follows barring a naturalist identity theory. Yet
such a theory is open to the responsibilist too, particularly if they adopt the
Kantian strategy of Section ....
To avoid overgeneralization, the objector must provide a more minimal
supervenience base that can do the explanatory work without subvening
respect for truth. But we need sensitivity to reasons to get the right
predictions about clairvoyance cases, and it subvenes respect for truth.
 See Sylvan  for such an argument.
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Perhaps there is some other story, but one hasn’t been given; again, Greco
himself agrees that clairvoyance cases necessitate a responsibilist require-
ment for justification.
So much for the YK dilemma. KR also addresses Sosa’s objections. Now,
Sosa (: ) does mention respect for truth in passing. He dismisses the
idea, claiming that his hedge fund managers and waste disposal engineers
needn’t have such respect to attain justification or knowledge. But his
dismissiveness rests on a failure to distinguish the relevant notion of respect
from the irrelevant notion Darwall () calls ‘appraisal respect.’
Appraisal respect amounts to esteem, and requires having a ‘high opin-
ion’ of the object of respect. By contrast, recognition respect in Darwall’s
() sense just requires giving the object of respect ‘appropriate weight
in deliberation.’ Yet if hedge fund managers and waste disposal engineers
exhibit sensitivity to evidence, they do then exhibit recognition respect for
truth, by giving appropriate weight in their doxastic deliberation to facts
about what’s probably true given their evidence. Hence, Sosa’s alleged
examples of justification without respect for truth are only examples of
justification without appraisal respect for truth, not without recognition
respect for truth. If we stipulate that the subjects lack recognition respect
for truth – i.e. that they don’t appropriately take truth-related reasons into
account – my intuitions change. The cases then don’t seem to be cases of
justified belief.
Recognition respect for truth doesn’t require love of truth or the norms
of truth: one might wish that one could avoid playing by these rules, despite
playing by them on pain of epistemic irrationality. All it requires, in
Darwall’s idiom, is appropriately taking truth-related considerations into
account. That is another way of saying that it only requires being heedful of
the epistemic reasons. That is intuitively required for justification.
KR also avoids Sosa’s unwanted blurring of the moral and the epistemic.
Admittedly, talk of respect sounds more natural in the moral case. But the
general notion of recognition respect isn’t distinctively moral, nor is the
moral case the only case in which recognition respect matters. One can
act with or without recognition respect for any rule, and exhibiting recog-
nition disrespect is sufficient for blameworthiness relative to the rule as a
general matter. The epistemic case is just a special case: failures of respect
for truth make epistemic blame fitting, manifestations of weak respect make
epistemic excuse fitting, and strong respect entails justification. KR only
 Darwall () now uses recognition respect in an essentially second-personal way, but the original
notion was more general, and could take mere objects and norms as objects.
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commits us to a structural analogy between epistemology and morality, and
doesn’t automatically yield moral encroachment.
I conclude, then, that none of the strongest philosophical objections to
earlier versions of AR extend to KR.
. Concluding Remarks
I think I’ve done enough to show that the stock objections to AR rest on
mistaking its periphery for its core. Of course, KR’s mere avoidance of
objections doesn’t give us sufficient reason to accept it, let alone prefer it to
reliabilist VE or non-virtue-theoretic views. But while a wholesale defense
of KR would take another paper, we can conclude with some reasons to
prefer it.
The main point to make is that KR shares the attractions but lacks the
vices of its competitors. Let’s take the non-virtue-theoretic competitors
first. By resting on a substantive appeal to reasons-sensitivity, KR absorbs
the attractions of evidentialist approaches. But it avoids their flaws for the
same reason. Perhaps most importantly, as I’ve argued elsewhere, the
requirement that justified beliefs conform to reasons as a manifestation of
sensitivity to reason-relations addresses the improper basing objections relia-
bilists have pressed. The same feature enables KR to circumvent the
speckled hen problem: while the belief that the hen has  speckles might
conform to the evidence, it couldn’t do as a manifestation of a disposition
to conform.
Similar claims go for the comparison with reliabilism. Sensitivity to
objective reason-relations entails reliability, and so KR secures the payoffs
yielded by making reliability necessary for justification. But because KR
does not take reliability to be sufficient for justification, it promises to avoid
the clairvoyance problem, especially if reasons-sensitivity is understood as
sensitivity to facts to which one has conscious access (as I did). Moreover,
by drawing a distinction between rationality and justification that rests on
a principled distinction among reasons drawn outside epistemology, the
account also avoids the new evil demon problem. That problem collapses
 KR is not incompatible with moral encroachment. One could hold a substantive view of respect for
truth that requires testimonial justice, where this is morally encroached. Indeed, Fricker’s ()
responsibilist epistemology of testimony resembles my general epistemology, similarly resting on a
framework of reasons-sensitive dispositions.
 By avoiding the ideology of character, KR also avoids the empirical objections of situationists, as
I argue in Sylvan .
 See Sylvan a and Lord and Sylvan forthcoming.
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into the problem of giving a rationale for denying justification but accord-
ing an inferior status to demon-worlders, which KR offers.
What about KR’s virtue-theoretic competitors? Some reasons to prefer
KR to these repeat reasons for preferring KR to pure reliabilism. Unadul-
terated versions of virtue reliabilism don’t explain the epistemic status
lacking in clairvoyants. KR is also preferable to hybrid versions of VE.
These can seem ad hoc, giving no unified reason for thinking that both
reliabilist and responsibilist properties are constitutive of virtue. KR, by
contrast, derives reliabilist and evidentialist themes from a unified core that
invokes responsiveness to reasons understood as they are in ethics, as facts
that objectively favor acts and attitudes. Furthermore, KR does so without
the excesses of previous responsibilisms.
I conclude, then, that we have strong reason to take KR seriously as a
competitor to virtue reliabilism and non-virtue-theoretic approaches.
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